

13 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Paul Walsh, SA/DCI
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Reactions to 12 December NFIB Meeting []

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The following are my reactions to the NFIB meeting on 12 December:

1. HUMINT. [] was devastatingly persuasive! It appeared to me that except for [] who was big enough to change his position as a result of the argument, the others either held to their position because they were concerned that it would be administratively inconvenient or because they had had their votes directed for them before they came to the meeting. The persuasive argument against a HUMINT category was [], that you don't want to single out that the information came from a human source and thereby focus attention on identifying it. What if we created a category of COMINT/HUMINT?

2. On the other major issue, I came away with some sympathy for Bobby Inman's technical/ELINT with uncertainty in my mind as to what we do with FIS. He seemed to want to treat that as part of COMINT while it's encrypted and in technical afterwards. I think this takes some additional exploration before I can make a decision. Is it practical to lump all this in technical?

3. [] and others certainly made a good point on the problems of communicators, secretaries, etc., who need clearances to process but not to know in detail. I really don't know how to handle this one without proliferating more codewords. Perhaps it's the same type of [] designation that we have with the sub-compartments under products with the [] meaning that while of necessity these persons have access to the full operational

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details, their informing themselves of them is neither necessary nor authorized. An individual, for instance, would not be read into the characteristics of a collection system just because he was going to have to process it, even though he might pick up some of those details in the course of processing.

At the same time there is a very valid point made by [] to the effect that if you can deduce the source by reading the message and you're not cleared for the source, you may not feel a responsibility for not talking about that source. I think the only way I can see around this is that when anyone is read into [] COMINT, for instance, he should be given a standard briefing of the value of COMINT and the fragility of it if the source is disclosed. One then admits that in the course of an [] COMINT clearance (or an [] [] clearance for communicators) certain deductions about the characteristics of the COMINT/Imagery systems will become known but disclosing them is a grievous offense. In short, we must alert people but not deliberately give them more information than they absolutely need. I'm not sure this is the right answer but I think we need to do some work in this area.

4. We discussed the EYES ONLY category without much conclusion. It is my opinion that EYES ONLY should not be used with foreign intelligence information. EYES ONLY is fine for privacy communications but if we allow the only dissemination of foreign intelligence to be done in an EYES ONLY category, we risk the suppression of legitimate intelligence dissemination.

5. Another reason for a COMINT/HUMINT category is I really think we've got to leave room over time for the State Department to get aboard. Perhaps they will, in fact, disseminate more to us if we can afford them better protection.

6. In response to [] comment about numerical ceilings, I certainly don't feel we would relax that under this new system. Part of your charter also should be to set up the procedures whereby we ZBB absolutely everything in conjunction with shifting to the new system.

7. All portions of this memorandum are classified Secret.

STANSFIELD TURNER

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